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1 Introduction
Earlier this year I published an article entitled “Unexpected Consequences of
Ricardian Expectations“ in this journal (Schlicht, 2013). While the mathematics
was correct, the conclusion I drew from it is wrong. I wrote in particular:
. . . the present value of the households’ lifetime income has increased
by switching from the pay-as-you-go regime to the debt regime. The
Barro expectations held by the subjects are not fulfilled. The neces-
sity for tax increases, that they believed to be unavoidable, never
arises. The households engage in precautionary savings in order
to finance tax increases that need never occur. . . . As the value of
their lifetime income stream has increased, they could have afforded
higher expenditure, with more consumption and more investment.
This is reasoning is mistaken. The savings are not precautionary savings, but
arise because households correctly anticipate tax increases and want to realize
optimal savings – keeping their consumption stream flat in face of anticipated
increasing taxation. Because of these savings, they receive additional income
from interest. These interest payments lead to increased lifetime income, but
such an increase would not occur without these savings. As a consequence, these
savings could not be spent without harming lifetime income, as I have wrongly
suggested. As an earlier referee put it (and I did not understand), disposable
income is endogenous to the problem (Anonymous, 2012).
I have convinced myself in the meanwhile that, with optimizing household
behavior, the Ricardian equivalence thesis is correct under quite general condi-
tions. Actually I should have seen that from earlier critical referee reports but
did not. Without any claim for originality I would explain this as follows in terms
of the household’s optimization strategy, rather than budget constraints.
Consider a representative household – one of many identical households.
The time path of wages the household receives is wt , the time path of interest is
rt , and the time path of taxation is zt . All these time paths are taken as given by
the household.
By deciding about consumption and accumulation, the household makes
a decision about the time path of its assets at . These assets include shares in
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firms and government bonds. Gross income of the household comprises wage
income wt and interest income rt at . The disposable income is gross income
minus taxes: wt +rt at −zt . This is used for consumption ct and savings. Savings
take the form of asset accumulation a˙t . So we have
wt + rt at − zt = ct + a˙t .
The household (or dynasty) chooses the time path of asset accumulation such
that its discounted utility
U =
∞∫
0
e−θt u (ct )d t
is maximized, where u (·) is its utility function and θ > 0 is the rate of time
preference.
Assume that, for given time paths of w , r , and z and for an initial stock of
assets a0, the time path at maximizes discounted utility. As discounted utility
can be written as
U =
∞∫
0
e−θt u (wt + rt at − zt − a˙t )d t ,
the maximization of U by a suitable choice of a is a standard problem in the
calculus of variations (Bolza, 1960, 22). If at is optimal, it must satisfy the Euler
equation
∂
∂at
e−θt u (wt + rt at − zt − a˙t )= d
d t
∂
∂a˙t
e−θt u
(
wt + rt at − g t − a˙t
)
which reduces to
e−θt u′rt =− d
d t
e−θt u′
and finally to
u′ (rt −θ)= u′′ (w˙t + r˙t at + rt a˙t − z˙t − a¨t ) . (1)
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This is the Euler equation in the presence of government debt. It must be
satisfied by the optimal time path of assets at . Under standard assumptions and
together with boundary values a0 and a∞ = 0, the differential equation (1) has a
unique solution at . In the following we assume that this is the case.
Different debt policies will affect the time series zt in (1) and will affect the
optimal accumulation of assets at . We describe the government’s debt policy
as follows. Let Gt denotes the (given) time series of government spending. The
government has to pay for this spending and serve the public debt D t at a rate
of interest rt . So it has to finance Gt + rt D t by taxes Zt and new debt D˙ t , and we
obtain the government’s budget constraint
Gt + rt D t = Zt + D˙ t (2)
This can be written in per capita terms a
g t + rt dt = zt + d˙t +γt
with g t = GtNt denoting per capita government spending, dt =
D t
Nt
per capita
government debt, zt = ZtNt per capita taxes, and γt =
N˙t
Nt
the time path of the rate
of population population growth. By selecting a fiscal policy, the government
selects a time series of new per capita debt d˙t which implies a time series of per
capita debt according to dt =
∫ t
0 d˙τdτ+d0. For such a policy, the implied per
capita taxation is
zt = g t + rt dt − d˙t −γt . (3)
Its change over time is
z˙t = g˙ t + r˙t dt + rt d˙t − d¨t − γ˙t .
Inserting this into the Euler equation yields
u′ (rt −θ)= u′′ (w˙t + r˙t at + rt a˙t − z˙t − a¨t ) .
u′ (rt −θ)= u′′
(
w˙t + r˙t at + rt a˙t − g˙ t − r˙t dt − rt d˙t + d¨t + γ˙t − a¨t
)
.
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As the assets comprise per capita capital kt and per capita debt dt we can replace
at by kt +dt , a˙t by k˙t + d˙t , and a¨t by k¨t + d¨t . This gives
u′ (rt −θ)= u′′
(
w˙t + r˙t (kt +dt )+ rt
(
k˙t + d˙t
)− g˙ t − r˙t dt − rt d˙t + d¨t + γ˙t − (k¨t + d¨t ))
and finally
u′ (rt −θ)= u′′
(
w˙t + r˙t kt + rt k˙t − g˙ t + γ˙t − k¨t
)
.
This is the Euler equation that would be obtained from (1) for the case that the
government runs a balanced budget and debt dt is zero for all t . Further, the
derivatives u′ and u′′ are taken at ct =wt+rt at−zt−a˙t . With (3) and at = kt+dt
this reduces to ct =wt + rt kt − g t +γt − k˙t which is, again, independent of the
government’s debt policy. This proves the Ricardian equivalence for the general
case of arbitrary time paths of the population, wages, and interest, and regardless
of any production function or theory of factor prices.
So I was completely wrong regarding this matter. I thought to provide an
internal criticism of the Ricardian equivalence thesis, thereby closing a gap
between theory and observation, but I failed. The gap remains. I can only offer
my apologies to the readers, the editors, and the referees for any unnecessary
work and inconvenience caused by my mistake.
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